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THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING CLIENTS WITH LIMITED 
COMPETENCY IN GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS 
HENRY DLUGACZ* AND CHRISTOPHER WIMMER** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A substantial body of literature has cropped up in the past twenty years 
addressing the role of and practical and ethical challenges facing attorneys 
representing individuals with mental disabilities,1 both in general practice 
and in proceedings (such as competency determinations in criminal cases 
and civil commitments) where mental disability is the central issue.2  Some of 
this literature overlaps with the larger body of literature from the past few 
decades on “client-centered” lawyering.3  Though we are indebted to these 
resources, few articles have addressed at length the specific ethical 
 
* M.S.W, J.D., Beldock, Levine & Hoffman, LLP, New York Medical College, New York Law 
School. 
** J.D., Brune and Richard LLP. 
 1. In this article, we use the term “mental disability” broadly to refer to a range of 
intellectual disabilities such as schizophrenia that are often characterized as “illnesses,” to 
progressive syndromes such as dementia that often accompany old age, and to 
developmental disabilities that remain relatively constant over life.  When we discuss “mental 
illness” specifically, we are primarily referring to mental illnesses thought of as serious and 
persistent, such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or schizoaffective disorders which are often 
amenable to treatment and will typically have a fluctuating course of time. 
 2. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law:  The Case of 
Competency, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 625 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts]; Jan Ellen Rein, 
Ethics and the Questionably Competent Client:  What the Model Rules Say & Don’t Say, 9 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 241 (1988); Leslie Salzman, Rethinking Guardianship (Again):  
Substituted Decision Making as a Violation of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 157 (2010). 
 3. For early examples of this work, see, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL 
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING:  A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977);  Richard Wasserstrom, 
Lawyers as Professionals:  Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. 1, 4-6 (1975); Marcy Strauss, 
Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship:  The Argument for Autonomy, 65 
N.C. L. REV. 315 (1986-1987).  For more recent works, see, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL B. 
BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS:  A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (2d ed. 
2004); Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand:  The Plural Values of Client-Centered 
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369 (2006). 
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challenges facing an attorney representing a person with limited competency 
who is the subject of a guardianship4 petition. 
The attorney representing a client with limited competency works in an 
ethical minefield.  The paramount value guiding the attorney-client 
representation is client autonomy – the exercise of self-determination. Yet 
the client with limited competency, by definition, has some degree of 
difficulty making the decisions that constitute self-determination. The 
attorney representing such a client must determine how best to vindicate 
client autonomy in the long term without unduly compromising it in the short 
term.  These questions are particularly nettlesome for the attorney 
representing a client who is the subject of a guardianship petition because 
he must simultaneously protect the information he has concerning the 
client’s condition in order to preserve the ability to contest the petition, 
zealously represent the client’s interests, and ensure that the client’s long-
term autonomy is not being sacrificed in the name of “beating” the petition.5  
The spectrum of limitations experienced by clients and the unique demands 
of each representation make categorical answers impossible and attorney 
judgments inevitable.  Our goal throughout this article is to offer a practical 
framework, and some concrete suggestions, for attorneys operating in an 
ethically muddy area.  Where we are unable to do this, we hope to at least 
frame the question clearly so that debate concerning an insufficiently 
discussed topic can be generated. 
Part II of this article describes the case of a representative  hypothetical 
client facing a guardianship petition.  Part III sets out the normative 
framework of our approach to client representation.  Part IV discusses the 
ethical challenges facing the attorney representing a client with a mental 
disability.  Part V provides some context about guardianship proceedings 
and applies the issues discussed in earlier sections to those proceedings.  
Part VI considers a scattering of related issues. 
II.  A HYPOTHETICAL: MS. X 
Ms. X is a 68-year-old woman living in a one-bedroom apartment in a 
large metropolitan area.6  She is not married and never had children.  Long 
 
 4. We use the term “guardianship,” though some states term the proceedings for the 
appointment of a person to supervise the affairs of a person with severe mental disabilities a 
“conservatorship.”  See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1800-04 (West 2002). 
 5. Unless, of course, the client makes an informed decision to do this and has the 
capacity to understand the consequences. 
 6. This hypothetical is a hybrid drawn from one of the author’s (HD) experiences in 
hundreds of legal proceedings involving people with mental disabilities as well as otherwise 
working with individuals with mental illness in various capacities.  Another hypothetical, and 
an effective attempt to work through some of these issues, was presented at the May 2003 
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ago, she lost track of a half-brother, her mother’s son, and she leads an 
isolated life. That brother, who is three years her junior, recently located Ms. 
X on Facebook, seeking to rekindle contact, but to date, Ms. X has declined 
to respond to his overture. 
While in her 20s, Ms. X worked regularly as a supervisor in a factory 
and achieved a Bachelor’s degree going to school at night.  She was 
injured in an explosion of a poorly maintained pipe and, while not 
permanently disabled, she secured a rather large settlement from a personal 
injury suit brought in connection with that incident.  Her overall functioning 
deteriorated as she stayed home recuperating, and she never returned to 
full-time employment again.  She also began to experience feelings of 
paranoia, thinking that her phone was tapped.  Her doctor mentioned 
schizophrenia and prescribed Thorazine.  This helped with her feelings of 
paranoia, but Ms. X developed involuntary twitches from the medication.  
She became increasingly self-conscious of them and continued her isolative 
behavior.  She has never executed a living will, health care proxy, last will 
and testament, or power of attorney. 
Over time, the state of Ms. X’s apartment has deteriorated, and 
occasionally her electricity is cut off.  Neighbors have brought this to the 
attention of building management, who has involved the city’s Adult 
Protective Services (“APS”).  APS has considered bringing guardianship 
petitions in the past but, when faced with this prospect, Ms. X has agreed to 
engage in intensified psychiatric treatment and has been willing to tap into 
her still adequate financial resources to restore her apartment to a more 
livable state.  Recently, though, she has appeared less amenable to 
intervention and her treatment providers wonder if she is showing early signs 
of dementia in addition to her long-standing mental illness.  Ms. X has 
begun to horde artifacts in her apartment – refusing, for example, to discard 
old newspapers, which now are stacked halfway to the ceiling in some 
portions of her apartment.  Her adherence to her prescribed medication 
regime has likewise become less steady as she is reluctant to leave the 
apartment for appointments with her psychiatrist.  Ms. X does not shop, but 
orders in Chinese takeout.  She does not do laundry; instead, she relies on 
a service that picks up her soiled clothing and cleans it.  There is concern 
that she may spend all of her savings on these types of services. 
APS has now moved forward with a guardianship petition seeking to 
have a community agency appointed guardian of Ms. X’s person and 
 
annual meeting of the National Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems, and is 
available online.  See Robert D. Fleischner, Selected Materials on Ethical Issues in the 
Representation of People with Disabilities, CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION (May 2003), 
www.centerforpublicrep.org/litigation-and-major-cases/litigation-issues/78-selected-materials 
-on-ethical-issues-in-the-representation-of-people-with-disabilities. 
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property.  You have been appointed to represent Ms. X, who is steadfastly 
opposed to the guardianship petition.  Her current belief is that she does not 
require psychotropic medications, as she no longer believes that she suffers 
from a mental disability.  She correctly recites the potentially dangerous side 
effects of these medications, some of which she has experienced, but also 
believes that the psychiatrist might be working in conjunction with her 
brother to “get their hands” on her bank account.7  She thinks that the 
medication is an attempt to cloud her mind so that they may achieve this 
goal.  She acknowledges that her apartment is cluttered, but says that she 
prefers it that way.  With respect to the concern that she may burn through 
her remaining money, Ms. X states the belief that it is better for her to spend 
her money as she sees fit than let it fall into the hands of her brother and 
psychiatrist.  To further complicate matters, Ms. X., a chain smoker, has 
developed a persistent cough.  She so far has declined efforts by her 
treatment team for an MRI, stating that she would rather not know what is 
“going on inside.” 
We will return to the case of Ms. X periodically in this article. 
III.  OUR NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK 
It is impossible to identify and resolve ethical issues in a reasoned way 
without first setting out a normative framework.  Articulating values forces 
the writer to identify his commitments and motivations, and makes it possible 
to test actions against stated values and identify which values are being 
given primacy and which are being sacrificed.  At the same time, a 
theoretical framework cannot resolve practical real-world problems on its 
own.  One can agree with the thesis we set out below and still come to 
completely different conclusions about how to handle any dilemma in actual 
practice.  What can be achieved is a sensitizing of the ethical compass: By 
considering the values at stake, and how various practical solutions do or 
do not serve those values, we become better judges of the options available 
to us when presented with actual clients and their desires and constraints. 
With that caveat, our normative thesis is this: (1) Autonomy is the 
paramount value in client representation.  (2) Whenever the attorney 
believes the client is competent, the attorney should respect her choice.8  (3) 
Whenever the attorney believes the client’s competency is limited, the 
attorney should intrude on the client’s autonomy in the short term only to the 
extent necessary to achieve ends that facilitate the client’s autonomy in the 
 
 7. For a recent, vivid portrayal of the complications created by an individual with some 
mental illness who resists treatment, see Rachel Aviv, God Knows Where I Am:  A Patient 
Rejects Her Diagnosis, THE NEW YORKER, May 30, 2011, at 57. 
 8. For sake of clarity, we have arbitrarily used masculine pronouns to refer to the 
attorney and feminine pronouns to refer to the client. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING CLIENTS 335 
long term.  (4) All of this should be undertaken with a healthy dose of self-
doubt.  We attempt to unpack, justify, and qualify this thesis below. 
(1) Autonomy is the paramount value in client representation. 
We, as most others who have considered the issue, believe that there 
are two overarching values governing the lawyer-client relationship.  The 
first is client autonomy.  The client, as any other human actor, is entitled to 
the unrestrained exercise of her will whenever it does not harm others.9  In 
this regard, the attorney’s role is to apply his specialized skills to realize the 
client’s goals.  The second principle is beneficence.  The attorney, as a 
professional with privileged status and significant powers of action and 
persuasion, is obligated to act in a way that benefits the client.10  To that 
extent, the attorney’s role is to apply his specialized skills to better the 
client’s situation or prevent it from deteriorating. 
It is not difficult to see how these principles can and do come into 
conflict in both theory and practice.  First, they focus on two separate actors.  
Autonomy begins from the perspective of the client; beneficence begins from 
the perspective of the attorney.  This sets up an inevitable conflict based on 
the subjectivity of experience and the different goals and motivations of the 
actors.  Second, even from the attorney’s perspective, the two values require 
the attorney to evaluate two different metrics to see whether the 
representation has “succeeded.”  To evaluate whether he has served client 
autonomy, the attorney must look to his conduct in the course of the 
representation and his interactions with the client: Did the client understand 
that she was in control of the representation and was she permitted to 
exercise that control within the wide bounds given to her?11  To evaluate 
whether he has served beneficence, the attorney looks to whether he 
achieved a “good” result for the client: Is she better off than she was at the 
beginning of the representation, or than she would have been without the 
attorney’s assistance? 
In our view, the value which must prevail, whenever possible, is client 
autonomy.  Our conclusion is based on two rationales.  First, because 
beneficence depends on a value judgment imposed by the attorney, it is 
suspect.  Even if the attorney is able to set aside the lenses of race, class, 
gender, or other elements of subjectivity that color his judgments, the 
judgments will still be his rather than the client’s.  Since the attorney is being 
 
 9. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010). 
 10. Id. 
 11. The discretion is bound, of course, by the attorney’s ethical and moral obligations not 
to assist the client in victimization of others (codified as the crime/fraud exception to attorney 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality) or, in sufficiently extreme cases, in harming herself.  See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6, 1.14 (2010). 
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retained by the client,12 he should act as an agent, not as a principal.  
Second, in the context of the attorney-client relationship, client autonomy is 
by definition the “best” result.13  The attorney is engaged not for the purpose 
of guiding the client in her life decisions, but to resolve a particular problem 
that has brought into play the legal system and that threatens the client’s 
autonomy – to defeat an indictment, prevent eviction, secure public benefits, 
or (as in the case of a guardianship petition) protect her right to be 
recognized as a legally competent actor.14  Replacing the client’s judgment 
with that of the attorney, even where the attorney acts with the best of 
intentions, replaces one threat to autonomy with another. 
This is an especially critical issue for attorneys representing marginalized 
populations.15  For those attorneys working in these fields who practice 
“client-centered” lawyering, the aim is to empower the client by helping her 
attain her goals through the legal process, rather than further subjugating 
her desires to the interests and convenience of the other parties, the legal 
system, or her attorney.16  In general, this means ensuring that the client’s 
objectives are pursued rather than those of the attorney, and that the 
attorney does not project his values onto the client and allow that projection 
to taint the representation.  As Foucault observed, for most individuals, their 
interactions with individual officers of government agencies are their most 
tangible interactions with power.17  The courts are a branch of government, 
and the attorney is an officer of the court.  Even if the attorney views himself 
as a “free radical” within this system, the reality is that he is an institutional 
actor – a repeat player – and he will very frequently be perceived as a part 
of the institution by the client.18  Thus, how attorney-client interactions play 
 
 12. This holds true even where the attorney is being paid by a state actor or some other 
disinterested third party; the attorney is the client’s, rather than the payor’s agent.  See infra 
Part III.D. 
 13. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy:  Mrs. Jones’s 
Case, 50 MD. L. REV. 213, 225 (1991) (“[T]he most notable theory of ‘the good’ to come out 
of the law schools in recent years defines the good in terms of the ‘choices’ people make 
when not under ‘domination.’  This sounds very much like a theory of autonomous choice.”). 
 14. As we discuss elsewhere, see infra Part V., the client may – but may not – choose to 
contest the proceeding or attempt to limit the scope of any subsequent guardianship order. 
 15. For a review of some of the vibrant literature in this area, see Paul R. Tremblay, 
Critical Legal Ethics, 20 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 133 (2007) (reviewing Lawyers’ Ethics 
and the Pursuit of Social Justice:  A Critical Reader (Susan D. Carle ed., 2005)). 
 16. Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:  Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 507 (1990). 
 17. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, “SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED”:  LECTURES AT THE 
COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1975-1976 (Arnold I. Davidson et al. eds., David Macey trans., Picador 
1997) (2003). 
 18. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. ¶ 1 (2010) (referring to lawyers as “officer[s] 
of the legal system”). 
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out is critical to the client’s assessment of her position in society, the respect 
she has been accorded, and her relationship to that power.  Put simply, the 
person who is able to exert her will in an interaction with her attorney is 
“empowered”; the person who is rebuffed is “disempowered.”19  Because 
empowerment is the goal of client-centered lawyering, when in conflict, 
beneficence should give way to autonomy.20 
(2) Whenever the attorney believes the client is competent, the attorney 
should respect her choice. 
If autonomy is the paramount value, then the attorney should not allow 
his views to interfere with the client’s choice when the attorney believes the 
client is acting competently – that is, when the attorney believes that the 
client is capable of exercising her autonomy. 
Several issues need to be unpacked here.  First, is the question of 
competency.  We have in mind here the model of competency developed in 
the case law and mental health literature regarding informed consent21 and 
described by the authors of the Macarthur Treatment Competence Study, a 
landmark empirical study into health care decision-making by individuals 
with mental illness.22  That study highlighted four decision-making abilities.23  
One is the ability to understand the information provided.24  A second is the 
ability to rationally manipulate the information provided (e.g., comparing 
 
 19. As we discuss infra Part IV.C.3, this notion is complicated by the reality that 
“autonomy” – the right and responsibility for making one’s own decisions – may not be what 
every client wants. 
 20. As we discuss passim below, the real-life interaction between these two values can be 
exceedingly complex. 
 21. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2005). Informed consent is “the 
agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated 
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available 
alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.”  Id.  (Emphasis added to underscore that 
communicating with another person involves a dyadic process whereby information is 
provided by one party (in this case, the attorney) and is received, clarified if necessary, and 
ultimately comprehended by the other (in this case, the client).) 
 22. See Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence 
Study. I:  Mental Illness and Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105 
(1995) [hereinafter Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competency Study. I]; 
Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. II:  Measures of Abilities 
Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995); Thomas 
Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III:  Abilities of 
Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995) 
[hereinafter Grisso & Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III]. 
 23. Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I, supra note 22, 
at 109-11. 
 24. Id. at 109-10. 
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benefits and risks of various options).25  A third is the ability to appreciate 
the situation and its consequences for decision-makers in the concrete, 
rather than merely in the abstract.26  A fourth is the ability to communicate 
choices.27  Limitations in any of these capacities interfere with client 
autonomy because they hinder the client’s ability to make choices that 
reflect her genuine preferences.28  Put another way, the attorney would 
believe the client is competent when she is making decisions under her own 
reason, and not under the influence of mistakes about facts, their 
interactions, or consequences, and is unable to communicate her choices 
accurately. 
A second issue is what it means for the attorney to “respect” a client’s 
choice – or, conversely, what it means to not “interfere” with a client’s 
choice.  It should not mean being a mere vessel for the client’s decisions.  
Providing the client with the attorney’s subjective views is not an intrusion on 
her autonomy, but rather a necessary precondition to her exercise of 
autonomy in the face of legal difficulties.  The attorney has superior 
knowledge of the legal system, the judge, and opposing counsel, and – if 
operating in a field where he has sufficient experience – possibly the 
practical consequences of resolving a dispute in a particular way.  Attorneys 
are retained or appointed not to be ticket-takers, but to bring their expertise 
and experience to bear on the problems of their clients.  They also serve an 
important role as an ally who can provide perspective on the facts at issue 
and the arguments the client is likely to face from the other parties to the 
matter.  An attorney’s opinion is important to most clients, and they are 
entitled to it.  The “choice” that should be respected is the one that the client 
makes after receiving from the attorney the information and counseling 
required to understand the options available and the consequences of 
choosing a specific course of action.  On the other hand, as detailed 
elsewhere,29 how the attorney elects to communicate his views is important.  
The attorney should not overbear the client’s will by presenting his opinions 
with much force or argue them as he would to a court.  For example, he 
may choose to communicate what he believes to be the “best” choice, but 
he should identify the assumptions he has made, the reasons for his 
conclusion, and the weaknesses in his approach. 
 
 25. Id. at 110-11. 
 26. Id. at 110. 
 27. Id. at 109. 
 28. Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I, supra note 22, 
at 109-11.  We acknowledge that this assumes that there is a “healthy” viewpoint for any 
individual. 
 29. See infra Part III.B. 
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A third issue is that we have phrased this precept from the perspective of 
what the “attorney believes.”  This is deliberate.  We are addressing how the 
attorney should conduct himself.  In actual practice, except in extreme cases, 
the attorney will never know with certainty whether (or to what degree) one 
or more of the client’s decision-making abilities is limited in some way.  He 
will necessarily have to depend on his perception of the client’s functioning.  
This puts into play issues of subjectivity, preconceptions, and prejudice 
regarding mental disability discussed elsewhere in this article,30 but there is 
no avoiding it.  The attorney representing a client who may have limited 
competency has little choice but to make judgments about the client’s 
functioning.  In the specific context of guardianship petitions, there will very 
frequently be some limitation on the client’s decision-making abilities; were 
there not some significant deficiency in functioning, a petition would not 
likely have been brought in the first place.31  Thus, the attorney will 
necessarily have to make judgments about how severe those limitations are, 
and whether they are interfering with the client’s rational thought, day-to-day 
functioning, and ability to exercise her autonomy.32  There are bases on 
which to make an informed judgment.  For example, an examination of 
specific areas of day-to-day functioning is useful.  Can the client manage a 
checking account? Is she sufficiently nourished?  Does she attend medical 
appointments and have the ability to follow through with treatment? But, in 
the end, there is no escaping the dilemma of subjectivity and the attorney’s 
limited understanding of the mind of another – there can only be awareness 
of it.33 
 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
 31. This is not to say that every person who is the subject of a guardianship petition ought 
to be found incompetent.  Quite the contrary.  As we discuss elsewhere, one can have some 
limitations on decision-making capacity and still be able to function very well with appropriate 
supports and limited intervention.  The point is that, setting aside a bad faith petition, the 
person who is the subject of the petition was likely demonstrating some characteristics that led 
someone in close contact with her to believe that she was unable to care for her own needs.  
However, particularly where the petitioner stands to gain (economically or otherwise) from the 
appointment of a guardian, the possibility of self interest on the part of the petitioner should 
be considered by the attorney representing the person alleged to be incapacitated.  See infra 
Part IV. 
 32. Stanley S. Herr, Representation of Clients with Disabilities:  Issues of Ethics and 
Control, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 609, 621-23 (1989-1990). 
 33. For an excellent fictional treatment of this dilemma, see, e.g., PAUL AUSTER, THE NEW 
YORK TRILOGY (Per Bregne ed., Green Integer 2008) (1987). 
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(3) Whenever the attorney believes the client’s competency is limited, the 
attorney should intrude on the client’s autonomy in the short term 
only to the extent necessary to achieve ends that facilitate the client’s 
autonomy in the long term. 
We believe that intrusions on client autonomy are permissible when the 
client is, because of mental disability or other limitation, unable to act 
autonomously.34  We believe intrusion is permissible in these situations 
because, if the client is limited in a material way in her ability to understand 
facts, their interactions, or their consequences, or in her ability to 
communicate her choices, then her ability to act autonomously is already 
impaired.35  The American Bar Association’s (ABA) model rule on the topic 
is consistent with this approach.  Model Rule 1.14 provides that, if the 
attorney reasonably believes the client is unable to act in her own best 
interests and is at risk of harm as a consequence, the attorney can take what 
the rule terms “protective action.”36 
It is important to distinguish, however, between a situation in which the 
attorney believes in a general sense that something is “not right” with the 
client, but can pinpoint no deficit in decision-making, and situations in 
which the client is showing difficulties with one of the four components of 
decision-making.  In the former situation, no intervention is warranted.  This 
approach is consistent with both Model Rule 1.14 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA).37 Under the ABA rule, the representation should be 
kept, “as far as reasonably possible, . . . normal.”38 Under the ADA, 
individuals with disabilities are to be provided, whenever possible, the same 
 
 34. We do not subscribe to the school of thought that holds that all human action is 
autonomous, regardless of its origin.  We do believe there is such a thing as mental disability, 
and that those suffering from the acute manifestations of such a disability may, over the long 
run, recover, and in the short run, through treatment and support, may return to rational 
thought and the conditions of autonomy.  What is critical to remember, and this is recognized 
by modern guardianship statutes at least in theory, is that mental disability is not synonymous 
with lack of capacity. 
 35. Appelbaum & Grisso, The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. I, supra note 22, 
at 109-11.  As with the second precept, this depends on the attorney making a judgment 
about the client’s competence based on his experience with her. 
 36. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R 1.14(b) (2010).  The commentary notes that such 
action might include “consulting with family members, using a reconsideration period to 
permit clarification or improvement of circumstances, using voluntary surrogate decision-
making tools such as durable powers of attorney or consulting with support groups, 
professional services, adult-protective agencies or other individuals or entities that have the 
ability to protect the client” or seeking appointment of a guardian.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R 1.14 cmt. 5 (2010). 
 37. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2010); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 12102 (2008). 
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(a) (2010). 
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services that others receive.39  Those with a “disability” are entitled to 
enjoyment of the same “services” of a “public accommodation” as those 
without a disability, unless the difference in service is “necessary to provide 
the individual . . . with a . . . service . . . that is as effective as that provided 
to others,” and attorney’s offices are defined under the ADA as “public 
accommodations.”40  As reflected in the ABA commentary and in the 
Macarthur Study, a person with mental disability or illness “often has the 
ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclusions about matters 
affecting the client’s own well-being.”41  That is, the attorney should not 
intrude upon the autonomy of a client with mental disability who is not 
showing deficits in decision-making simply because the client shows other 
symptoms of mental disability. 
We also believe that the primary permissible intrusion on client 
autonomy is one that invades short-term autonomy in order to foster long-
term autonomy.  The attorney should not be acting for his own convenience.  
For example, we would say that an attorney who unilaterally decides to rely 
on a client’s family member to gain information about a client simply 
because the client has become difficult to work with has acted 
inappropriately.  He has intruded on short-term autonomy by breaching the 
duties of client confidentiality,42 client communication,43 and possibly client 
loyalty,44 but is not helping to support the client to maintain long-term 
autonomy.45  By contrast, we would say that an attorney who pursues a 
meritorious appeal for a criminal defendant who, solely because of 
manifestations of mental illness, wishes to drop the appeal, has acted 
appropriately.  He has intruded on the defendant’s short-term autonomy by 
overriding his request to drop the appeal.  However, he has kept options 
open for the defendant rather than foreclosing them, and has made it less 
likely that the defendant will suffer criminal punishment (including 
 
 39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-65 (2008) (prohibiting discrimination by public entities, 
including public transportation services); Title III, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-89 (2006) (prohibiting 
discrimination by private entities in public accommodations and services).  See also Salzman, 
supra note 2, at 183-87. 
 40. RONALD M. HAGER, NAT’L DISABILITY RTS. NETWORK (NDRN), PRACTICAL ETHICS:  SERVING 
CLIENTS WITH LIMITED COGNITIVE ABILITY AND LIMITED COMMUNICATION ABILITY 10-11 (2009).  
See also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181(7)(F), 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (2008). 
 41. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 1 (2010); Grisso & Appelbaum, The 
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study. III, supra note 22, at 173. 
 42. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). 
 43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010). 
 44. See infra Part III.D. 
 45. There are cases in which it may be appropriate to include family members, but this 
should be with the client’s knowledge and consent and for the specific purpose of achieving 
the client’s goals in the representation.  See infra Part IV.C. 
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incarceration, which can be especially harsh on those with mental illness),46 
which is a much more serious intrusion on autonomy.  Many decisions are 
not so easy.  As detailed below,47 determining what intrusions will foster 
long-term autonomy is especially thorny in the guardianship context. 
Finally, any intrusion on short-term autonomy should be the least 
restrictive necessary to deal with the problems created by the client’s limited 
competency.  This approach is consistent with the ABA commentary to 
Model Rule 1.14 and an ABA formal opinion.48  The commentary highlights 
that, in taking “protective action,” the attorney should “intrud[e] into the 
client’s decisionmaking autonomy to the least extent feasible . . . .”49  The 
opinion similarly states that “the principle of respecting the client’s autonomy 
dictates that the action taken by a lawyer who believes the client can no 
longer adequately act in his or her own interest should be the action that is 
reasonably viewed as the least restrictive action under the circumstances.”50 
(4) All of this should be undertaken with a healthy dose of self-doubt. 
A final key element of our normative framework is self-doubt.  We 
believe that none of us is free from misconceptions and prejudices, making 
it critical that we monitor our reactions to our clients and how they may be 
affecting our judgments.  If we are prone to viewing those with mental illness 
as helpless and disenfranchised, we may resolve ethical dilemmas too much 
in favor of paternalism.  If we emphasize personal responsibility, we may be 
too harsh in thinking that the client’s views should conform to generally 
accepted norms or that the client should be made to “learn” from her 
“mistakes.”  If we are excessively rights-oriented, in the sense that we believe 
that all people must seek to vindicate their rights to the greatest extent 
possible in all situations, we may push the client to aggressively litigate 
where she might wish to settle or acquiesce.51  But a “healthy” dose of self-
doubt is not a paralyzing dose.  Self-doubt does not mean handwringing.  It 
 
 46. Jamie Fellner, Special Comment:  A Human Rights Perspective on Segregating the 
Mentally Ill, CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP., May/June 2009, at 1079, 1080, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/05/18/special-comment-human-rights-perspective-segre 
gating-mentally-ill; Jamie Fellner, Afterwords:  A Few Reflections, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 
1079, 1082 (2008);  David Lovell, L. Clark Johnson, & Kevin C. Cain, Recidivism of 
Supermax Prisoners in Washington State, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 633, 634-35 (2007). 
 47. See infra Part IV. 
 48. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2010).  See also ABA Comm. On 
Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
 49. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 5 (2010). 
 50. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
 51. The specific correlate in the guardianship context is that having a guardian appointed 
is a relief to some people who have struggled to function daily but whose sense of pride or 
lack of insight into their disabilities has thwarted their ability to accept assistance through less 
intrusive means. 
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means skepticism about one’s first reactions and a willingness to engage in 
ongoing self monitoring. 
Stating this normative framework does not resolve the many ethical 
issues that can arise in the course of a representation of an individual with a 
mental disability, as the balance of this article will show.  We cannot resolve 
individual, concrete dilemmas by reference to abstract principles.  Yet it 
does provide a backdrop against which to assess the conduct of the attorney 
taking on such representations. 
IV.  ETHICAL ISSUES IN REPRESENTATIONS OF CLIENTS WITH LIMITED COMPETENCY 
There are four key ethical issues that arise in the representation of any 
client – (1) preservation of client authority, (2) adequate communication with 
the client, (3) preservation of confidential information, and (4) avoidance of 
conflicts of interest.52  Each of these is underpinned by autonomy concerns.  
The key decisions are the client’s to make.  To make those decisions, the 
client needs to be adequately informed.  To communicate the key 
information to the attorney necessary for the client to be informed about the 
legal consequences of the facts and her options, the client needs to know 
that her information will be kept confidential.  To rely on the attorney to 
carry out her desires, and so trust that she is receiving accurate information 
and can rely on the attorney in certain tactical areas, the client needs to 
know that she has the attorney’s undivided loyalty. 
Carrying out each of the four core ethical duties becomes more 
complicated when dealing with a client who has limited competency 
because of mental disability.  The client may have a limited ability to 
communicate desires and information.  The client may have a limited ability 
to understand information communicated by the attorney or a limited ability 
to understand choices.  The client may voice desires that do not appear to 
be in her best interests, raising the possibility— but not proving— that she is 
not acting rationally.  The interests of the attorney may conflict with the 
client, or the client may believe they do. 
We consider each of these duties in turn, relying in the first instance on 
the formulation of them in the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility53 and amplifying this with a discussion of how these duties fit 
into our normative framework, and then applying them to the representation 
of the client with limited competency.  To return to a theme: The ABA Model 
 
 52. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. (2010). 
 53. Though each jurisdiction has its own rules governing attorney practice, we focus on 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility because they are the most influential and 
serve as the pattern for most states’ rules. 
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Rules are permissive, and provide limited guidance in practice.54  A 
normative framework, even if carefully developed, also cannot determine 
the correct answer to any dilemma.  The attorney must still decide how to 
act on a case-by-case basis. 
A. Client Authority 
The attorney is the client’s agent.  The representation is the client’s, and 
the life affected is the client’s.  In our hypothetical, it will be Ms. X, not the 
attorney, who loses some of her right to self-determination if the 
guardianship petition is granted – and it will be Ms. X, not the attorney, who 
may continue to live in a state of continuing decline if it is denied.  The 
attorney ought to bring the full breadth of his knowledge, insight, 
experience, and judgment to bear on the client’s issues, but the key 
decisions that define the representation are the client’s to make. 
The ABA has a Model Rule that deals with this issue.55  It distinguishes 
between the ends of the representation – which it states are the client’s to 
determine – and the means of achieving those ends – about which it states 
the attorney must consult with the client.56  Model Rule 1.2 provides that “a 
lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the 
representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which 
they are to be pursued.”57 
The official commentary to the rule reiterates this basic division: The 
client has “the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by 
legal representation.”58  The attorney “shall consult” with the client about 
strategic matters.59  The commentary acknowledges that, as a matter of 
practice, “[c]lients normally defer to the special knowledge and skill of their 
lawyer with respect to the means to be used to accomplish their objectives, 
particularly with respect to technical, legal and tactical matters.”60  Neither 
the rule nor commentary, however, provides a mechanism for determining 
how to resolve conflicts over strategy, except to note that, at the outer limits, 
the attorney may withdraw and the client may discharge the attorney.61 
This rule requires modification to fit within our framework.  Its basic 
division between “ends” and “means” does not acknowledge that how an 
 
 54. Herr, supra note 32, at 620 (noting “the professional codes do not provide much aid 
to effective, client-centered lawyering”).  See also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, SCOPE ¶ 
14 (2010). 
 55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2010). 
 56. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2010). 
 57. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010). 
 58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 1 (2010). 
 59. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010). 
 60. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2010). 
 61. Id. 
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end is pursued may be as important to the client as achievement of the 
goal, and that, for the client whose goal is not simply to vindicate her legal 
rights to the maximum extent possible, there may not be a clear “means” 
and “ends” distinction.  For example, a client in a commercial dispute with 
an important business partner may be willing to write aggressive letters and 
even file a complaint to bring the dispute to a head, but may not be willing 
to notice the depositions of particular witnesses because to do so would be 
inflammatory.  Conversely, it may be important to such a client to notice 
particular depositions as quickly as possible and not grant any continuances 
or extensions.  In the family law or guardianship context, how arguments are 
presented can have a critical impact on ongoing relationships that the client 
may depend upon on a day-to-day basis.  That a client has chosen to take 
recourse to available legal protections in her dispute with a friend or family 
member does not mean that she is prepared to (or can) sever all 
connections to that person.  Yet the rule directs only that the attorney 
“consult” with the client on these “technical, legal and tactical” matters, 
suggesting that the final decisions about these matters rest with the 
attorney.62  Further, while the rule accurately notes that clients often defer to 
their attorneys on these matters,63 it does not consider why that is so or 
whether it is appropriate.  There is also reason to question whether this 
claim is accurate as a descriptive matter.  Aside from the concerns described 
above, most clients bearing some or all of the costs of representation will be 
interested in the costs and benefits of “tactical” or “technical” decisions.  
Finally, the rule also provides no guidance on how to resolve any conflicts 
that may arise between the client and the attorney on “means” other than to 
note that, at the outer edges, the attorney may withdraw.64 
We would clarify that, as a starting point, the attorney should give the 
client the opportunity to approve every significant action in a representation.  
Each practice will have its own set of “significant actions,” but we would 
include classic “tactical” decisions such as whether to serve discovery 
requests, whether to seek depositions of any individual, and whether and 
whom to call as witnesses at any hearing.  This approach serves client 
autonomy by ensuring that the client maintains authority over every aspect of 
the representation, and by reinforcing the agent-principal nature of the 
attorney-client relationship.  For related reasons, it also protects the 
attorney-client relationship.  For example, Ms. X, who already suspects that 
her brother and psychiatrist are scheming against her, may begin to suspect 
her attorney, as well, if he makes decisions without her. This approach also 
 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id.  As discussed infra Part IV.C.5, withdrawal is generally an unsatisfactory solution 
for both the attorney and the client. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
346 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:331 
offers considerable benefits to the attorney.  In general, clients who are 
more involved with a representation are more responsive to requests for 
information and answer questions more effectively.  The client who is aware 
of the many technical and tactical decisions that an attorney must make 
during the course of the representation will better appreciate the need for 
the attorney’s expertise.  The client who is kept abreast of even minor 
developments and who approves tactical decisions is also less likely to be 
surprised by an adverse result, and so less likely to pursue or succeed on a 
malpractice claim at the end of the representation. 
There are a number of factors that may affect whether and how an 
attorney preserves client authority when the client has limited competency.  
Because attorneys, like everyone else, may harbor misconceptions 
concerning people with mental disabilities,65 they may tend to discount or 
ignore the opinions of clients with mental disabilities.  For example, the 
attorney who treasures neatness, order, and the company of others may 
discount Ms. X’s claim that she prefers to live a more isolated existence 
amongst piles of newspapers and other clutter.  This may lead the attorney 
to override, either explicitly or by excessively forceful persuasion, the view of 
such a client on matters that the attorney regards as “technical, legal and 
tactical,”66 or in the extreme case, override the client’s choices about end 
goals.  Attorneys often have a tendency to combat the “opponent” in any 
representation in order to “win” for themselves or the client, and may seek 
this result without regard to its impact on the client or to whether the client 
shares this goal.67  When a judge has observed a client with symptoms of 
limited competency, he or she may look to the attorney to act as a decision-
maker, either in the hopes of reaching a favorable result, or out of a desire 
to smooth the processing of the client’s case.  The client may not be used to 
exercising her autonomy without interference, and so may be hesitant to 
voice her opinion.  The client may also be so overwhelmed by the prospect 
of a negative outcome to the representation that she automatically defers to 
the attorney, or actively requests that he make all decisions for her, in the 
 
 65. Michael L. Perlin, “You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks”:  Sanism in Clinical 
Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683, 684, 689-90 (2003) [hereinafter Perlin, Sanism].  Cf. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 2011 WL 2437013, at *19 (June 20, 2011) (Ginsberg, J., 
dissenting) (“Managers, like all humankind, may be prey to the biases of which they are 
unaware.”). 
 66. As noted above, ABA Model Rule 1.2 provides cover for this tendency.  MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2010). 
 67. See Sandra Day O’Conner, Assoc. Justice, Sup. Ct. of the U.S., Professionalism, in 
78 OR. L. REV. 385, 387 (1999).  This tendency can be born of competitiveness, of the belief 
that every client should seek the full vindication of her legal rights to the maximum extent 
possible, or of a tendency to see the client as a metonym for a class of similarly situated 
individuals. 
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belief that doing so will best protect her.  The client may also have difficulty 
making choices – either failing to decide or vacillating.  In an extreme 
circumstance, the client may stake out a position based upon a false belief 
which is not amenable to modification based upon contravening 
information.  Ms. X may believe that, if the guardianship petition is granted, 
her brother will immediately have her committed “forever” – and may refuse 
to believe the attorney’s explanations of the procedural safeguards designed 
to prevent such an abuse.  Any of these problems can result in a 
representation where the client is unable or not permitted to exercise self-
determination. 
B. Communication With the Client 
The client cannot exercise her authority unless adequately informed.  
The ABA has a Model Rule that deals with this issue, as well.68 In general 
terms, it requires the attorney to keep the client abreast of the representation 
so that she can make informed decisions.69  ABA Model Rule 1.4 provides 
that the attorney shall keep the client informed of key facts and 
developments in the representation, consult with the client on the means by 
which objectives are pursued, comply with reasonable requests for 
information, and “explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation.”70  The commentary sums up the purpose of this rule pithily: 
“Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary 
for the client effectively to participate in the representation.”71 
Neither the commentary nor the rule, however, provides much guidance 
as to what is “reasonable communication” or how much information is 
“reasonably necessary” for the client to make an “informed decision.”72  The 
answer cannot simply be to provide “all the information.”  No attorney can 
provide a client with every possible fact that could affect the client’s 
decision.  In addition, flooding a client with information that may not be 
relevant to her decision does not facilitate autonomy – it may just paralyze 
her decision-making process, making her more reliant on the attorney.  
Happily, there is a well-developed body of case law in a highly analogous 
area that provides some guidance.73 
The doctrine of “informed consent” to medical procedures arose from 
concerns similar to those which resulted in the client-centered lawyering 
 
 68. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2010). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 1 (2010). 
 72. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 cmt. 1-4 (2010). 
 73. See infra notes 74-79. 
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model – the recognition of the right of patients to control what is done to 
their bodies – and can be justified on similar normative (autonomy) and 
practical (the need for them to be active partners in their own care for 
effective results) grounds.74  In its modern formulation, the informed consent 
doctrine generally requires that a physician disclose to a patient “what is 
reasonably necessary for a reasonable person to make an intelligent 
decision with respect to the choices of treatment or diagnosis.”75  The states 
are split over whether the scope of disclosure is determined from the 
physician’s76 or patient’s77 viewpoint, but disclosures normally must include 
“the nature of the pertinent ailment or condition, the general nature of the 
proposed treatment or procedure, the prospects of success, the risks of 
failing to undergo any treatment or procedure at all, and the risks of any 
alternate methods of treatment.  A physician must also inform the patient of 
any alternatives that exist to a surgical procedure.”78  The physician 
generally need not disclose “alternative treatments or procedures which are 
not accepted as feasible,”79 and “need not disclose absolutely every fact or 
remote possibility that could theoretically accompany a procedure.”80  
 
 74. See Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking:  Informed Consent and the 
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 41, 44-49 (1979-80).  See also Stouffer v. Reid, 965 
A.2d 96, 101 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009) (“The fountainhead of the doctrine . . . is the 
patient’s right to exercise control over his own body . . . .”) (internal citations, quotations, and 
alteration omitted). 
 75. Jandre v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 792 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Wis. Ct. App. 2010) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
 76. See, e.g., Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1254 (10th Cir. 2010) (under Wyoming 
law, “[a] physician is required to disclose only such risks that a reasonable practitioner of like 
training would have disclosed in the same or similar circumstances.”) (internal citations, 
quotations, and alteration omitted); Melton v. Medtronic, Inc., 698 S.E.2d 886, 894 (S.C. Ct. 
App. 2010) (“The scope of a physician’s duty to disclose is measured by those 
communications a reasonable medical practitioner in the same branch of medicine would 
make under the same or similar circumstances.”) (internal citations, quotations, and alteration 
omitted). 
 77. See, e.g., Wyszomierski v. Siracusa, 963 A.2d 943, 952 n.14 (Conn. 2009) (“The lay 
standard requires a physician to provide the patient with the information which a reasonable 
patient would have found material for making a decision whether to embark upon a 
contemplated course of therapy.”) (internal citations, quotations, and alteration omitted); Univ. 
of Md. Medical Sys. Corp. v. Waldt, 983 A.2d 112, 127 (Md. 2009) (“[T]he scope of the 
physician’s duty to inform is to be measured by the materiality of the information to the 
decision of the patient.  A material risk is one which a physician knows or ought to know 
would be significant to a reasonable person in the patient’s position.”) (internal citation, 
quotation, and alteration omitted). 
 78. Pertuit v. Tenant Louisiana Health Systems, 49 So.3d 932, 936 (La. Ct. App. 2010). 
 79. Id. at 937. 
 80. Hageny v. Bodensteiner, 762 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Wis. Ct. App. 2008) (citation 
omitted). 
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However, the physician may be required to make more specific or detailed 
disclosures if “the physician knows or should know of a patient’s unique 
concern or lack of familiarity with medical procedures . . . .”81 
These formulations provide a fair guide to attorneys.  The attorney 
should disclose to the client the basic nature of her matter and the general 
legal standards governing it, the material facts about the representation, the 
risks inherent in staking out contemplated positions and taking 
contemplated tactical decisions, and the availability of alternatives to any of 
these.  The attorney need not disclose infeasible approaches (e.g., seeking a 
declaration of unconstitutionality in a case where such a ruling is clearly 
foreclosed).  He should disclose particular facts or issues if he knows that 
the client will be interested in them.  For example, some clients may be 
interested in asserting the unconstitutionality of a practice, even if such a 
ruling is foreclosed, or may be particularly sensitive to anyone becoming 
aware of their mental disability (e.g., someone who generally functions very 
well and is aware of the negative social consequences which disclosure 
might involve),82 and so may want to avoid any disclosure whatsoever, even 
if it might benefit her in the representation.  Ms. X’s experience of suffering 
severe injuries due to poorly maintained facilities may have galvanized her 
desire for justice, making her willing to stake out aggressive positions in the 
interest of advancing the cause of those similarly situated to her.  Or, her 
sense of loss due to the explosion may drive her to reveal as little as possible 
about her condition.  Finally, though, the informed consent doctrine does 
not answer the problem.  It is a malpractice standard; beyond its limits, one 
is open to civil suit.  While malpractice is a concern for attorneys,83 we 
should hold ourselves to a higher standard.  The question should be not 
simply, “What can I do without being sued?” but “What is the best action to 
take within the range of permissible actions?” 
In assessing the scope of disclosures to make, the attorney should also 
be mindful of the impact of heuristic biases such as salience. Outlier 
possibilities with severe negative impacts – such as death for one 
considering undergoing a minor medical procedure, or imprisonment for 
 
 81. Hernandez ex rel. Telles-Hernandez v. United States, 665 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1077 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (internal citation and quotations omitted). 
 82. For a poignant description of a leading psychologist’s struggle with these issues in her 
personal and professional life, see Benedict Carey, Expert of Mental Illness Reveals Her Own 
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/health/23lives.html 
 83. Though we are unaware of any particular malpractice lawsuits in this context, it would 
not be hard to imagine a disappointed client, or family member of a client, filing suit against 
an attorney based on the attorney’s failure to prevent the client from making a clearly “bad” 
decision when the attorney believed he was serving short-term autonomy, or failing to 
zealously contest guardianship when the attorney believed he was protecting the client’s well-
being. 
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one facing a very minor criminal charge – become outsized possibilities in 
the mind of the person faced with them, and can distort rational decision-
making. Overwhelming the client with information that will frighten or upset 
her to an extreme degree, although extremely unlikely to occur, does not 
serve autonomy.84  The order in which information is presented (primacy 
and recency) can also play a significant role in determining decisions, and 
the attorney should be conscious of what he chooses to emphasize by 
placing them first and last.  For example, the attorney who believes that Ms. 
X should be under some sort of supervision may find himself discussing the 
benefits of the proposed guardianship first, then acknowledging the loss of 
rights, and finally returning again to the benefits.  If he does not reflect on 
this inclination, the attorney risks unnecessarily supervening the client’s will. 
Putting together the issues of informed consent, individuality, existence 
of heuristics, and self-monitoring: The attorney needs to be aware, in the 
process of communicating information, what he chooses to include and 
what he chooses to exclude; needs to consider the manner and order in 
which information is presented; and should remain mindful of the client’s 
individual characteristics by including everything she would be interested in 
knowing and being wary of how he addresses outlier possibilities that may 
be especially alarming to the client.  As in other facets of the representation, 
there is no way to avoid attorney judgments in this regard.  Self-monitoring 
and consulting with other attorneys is the best way to ensure that the client 
receives all the information she needs in a way that facilitates, rather than 
guides or determines, her decisions. 
In the representation of a client with limited competency, a number of 
factors may complicate the execution of the duty of communication.85  The 
attorney accustomed to quick interactions with clients may lack the patience 
required to communicate with someone who has trouble understanding or 
remembering key facts.  Even a patient attorney may simply be too busy with 
other matters to give the client the time she needs to understand case 
developments.  The communication strategies that the attorney usually 
employs without reflection in other representations may not be effective.  
The risk is that, out of a desire to reach the “best” result for the client, the 
attorney may be over-selective in the information he provides.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, the attorney may overwhelm the client with 
 
 84. This is an area for the exercise of great caution.  It can be difficult to distinguish 
withholding information in service of long-term autonomy from doing so out of paternalism. 
 85. The commentary to Model Rule 1.4 notes this issue.  “Ordinarily, the information to 
be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult.  
However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for 
example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity.”  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.4 cmt. 6 (2010). 
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too much information, or with information to which the client may be 
extremely sensitive even if it is of little practical import. 
C. Confidentiality of Client Information 
The client cannot provide the attorney with all the material information 
about a representation unless she can rest assured that the attorney will not 
disclose the information to anyone unless it is required to achieve the goals 
of the representation.86 This is of special concern where the information 
might be embarrassing if brought to light, or might undermine the client’s 
goals in the representation if revealed to the court or to any other party. 
ABA Model Rule 1.6 bars disclosure of information relating to the 
representation absent consent or exigency.87  The consent can be actual 
“informed consent” or implied, as when the disclosure is “impliedly 
authorized in order to carry out the representation.”88  The exigencies 
include prevention of bodily or property harm and seeking ethical guidance 
about the representation, among others.89 
This is an area where any compromise must be very carefully 
considered.  The loss of trust that can result from inappropriate disclosure of 
confidential information can be very detrimental to the representation, and 
the sense of betrayal and exposure can be traumatic for the client.  For 
example, Ms. X has a history of paranoia and distrust of those close to her.  
If she learns that her attorney has revealed information to her psychiatrist or 
her brother without her consent, the representation may be irremediably 
damaged. Workarounds are available to avoid disclosing client confidences 
when the attorney needs to consult with someone outside the protection of 
attorney-client privilege without seeking the client’s consent.90  The most 
commonly employed workaround, and perhaps the most effective, is to 
describe the client and her issue in sufficiently general terms to prevent 
identification, but specific enough terms to permit comment on the client’s 
situation.91 
 
 86. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). 
 87. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). 
 88. Id.  The rule’s commentary offers as an example attorneys within a firm discussing a 
case.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. (2010). 
 89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010). 
 90. Consultants and others retained to assist in a litigation are frequently covered by the 
attorney-client privilege.  Some courts recognize an even broader category of individuals to 
whom information may be disclosed – those to whom disclosure was beneficial to the 
representation and who could be expected to keep the information disclosed confidential. 
 91. This approach can be justified because it is not the pure disclosure of the facts of the 
client’s situation that are harmful, but the disclosure of those facts in a way that would 
associate them with the particular client. 
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Issues of confidentiality are more likely to arise and more difficult to 
navigate in the representation of a client with mental disability.  The issues 
are more likely to arise because the attorney may feel a greater need to 
seek assistance from other attorneys, physicians, mental health experts, or 
friends and family without formal client consent (e.g., in order to determine 
whether the client is suffering from limited competency or to determine 
appropriate techniques for working with a client who is).  Confidentiality 
issues are more difficult to navigate with mentally ill clients because the 
disclosure can be extremely harmful to the client’s interests and to the 
representation.  For example, the attorney who consults with a physician 
about the client’s competency without client consent risks making the 
conversation available for discovery by other parties.92  The impact of such 
a disclosure can range from embarrassment and adverse cross-examination 
material in a matter where mental health is not the central concern, to 
frustration of the very purpose of the representation in matters where mental 
health is squarely at issue. 
It is no surprise that this is the only area that the ABA Model Rule on 
clients with diminished capacity treats explicitly.  It states that client 
information must still be kept confidential, even when the attorney is taking 
protective action.93  Implied disclosure should not be interpreted as an 
exception that swallows the rule.  In particular, “the lawyer is impliedly 
authorized . . . to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent 
reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests.”94 This can make any 
disclosure of the client’s condition forbidden in some circumstances.  As the 
commentary notes, “[d]isclosure of the client’s diminished capacity could 
adversely affect the client’s interests. For example, raising the question of 
diminished capacity could, in some circumstances, lead to proceedings for 
involuntary commitment.”95 
One example of when disclosure might be appropriate and permissible 
is when a lawyer consults with a physician about a client who is having 
difficulty communicating or making decisions about the representation.  ABA 
Informal Opinion 89-1530 permits such disclosures, even absent client 
consent,96 so that the attorney may determine whether the client remains 
capable of acting in her own best interest and may understand whether 
 
 92. If the attorney consults with a treating physician, the physician-patient privilege would 
likely prevent the physician from testifying against the client in the guardianship proceeding if it 
were a contested matter.  See In re Guardian of Derek, 12 Misc. 3d 1132 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 
2006).  Cf. In re Guardian of Linda Tian, 10/15/2007 N.Y.L.J. 30 (col. 4) (ordering release 
of medical records in uncontested matter). 
 93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(c) (2010). 
 94. Id. 
 95. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 cmt. 8 (2010). 
 96. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1530 (1989). 
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further protective action is necessary.  For example, if Ms. X’s condition 
deteriorates to the point of incoherence, the attorney may seek specific 
advice from a physician in order to ensure that her health is not at 
immediate risk and that she remains capable of making decisions. 
D. Attorney Loyalty 
Each client is entitled to the undivided loyalty of her attorney.  This 
means that, with respect to the representation, the attorney is beholden to 
no one besides the client.  ABA Model Rules 1.7 and 1.8 identify several 
types of conflict of interest.97 We highlight two in particular for this article: 
(1) unless the attorney gets the informed written consent of the client, she 
must not take on a representation if doing so creates a “significant risk” that 
the representation will be “materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities 
to, [among others], a third person,”98 and (2) the attorney cannot be paid by 
someone other than the client unless “the client gives informed consent; 
there is no interference with the lawyer’s independence of professional 
judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and information relating to 
representation of a client” is kept confidential.99 
It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust in an attorney 
unless she is confident that he is acting in accordance with her wishes.  The 
client with mental illness may already doubt the attorney’s loyalty.  This risk 
is exacerbated when the attorney is appointed by the court.  The client may 
wonder whether the attorney has been assigned in order to zealously 
represent her, or instead to facilitate her processing through the legal 
system.  Ms. X already believes her APS-appointed psychiatrist is working 
against her; she may expect the same of her court-appointed attorney.  
Some of this is unjustified.  An attorney who appears regularly in the probate 
and mental health courts may have relationships with opposing counsel, 
judges, and court personnel, and familiarity with the procedures employed 
by courts or judges hearing mental disability matters that are constructive in 
furthering the client’s goals.  Appointed counsel who specialize in a 
particular area often have specialized knowledge which can assist the client 
in decision-making.  But, some of this concern is rational: Both civil and 
criminal appointed attorneys may be poorly paid, and their compensation is 
often structured on a “per case” or “per motion” basis.  There are thus 
strong personal disincentives to thorough preparation, even for the 
committed attorney.  If the appointed attorney spends too much time on any 
one case, he cannot tend to his other cases, and if he does not handle 
 
 97. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7, 1.8 (2002). 
 98. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.7 (2002). 
 99. MODEL RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 1.8(f) (2002). 
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enough cases to make a living, then he will be forced to seek better-paying 
work elsewhere, preventing him from taking on any appointed cases.  There 
are also institutional pressures: The attorney who depends on the goodwill 
of others in the system (e.g., judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull 
his punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credibility for future 
interactions (which he would put to use for his future clients).  Judges want 
cases resolved. 
The stigma of mental disability, abetted by cultural myths and negative 
media portrayals, creates additional problems.  The client with some form of 
mental disability or illness may have learned not to trust her own instincts, 
and may tend to be overly reliant on the advice of others.  “The client with 
mental disabilities may be uniquely in need of skills and assertiveness 
training to function as a participatory, and not nominal, client.”100  
Conversely, the client may seek to maintain a sense of pride and dignity by 
minimizing her difficulties in functioning, and so display confidence when 
she is, in fact, confused.  Ms. X might present such a scenario: She worked 
her way into a supervisory position and put herself through night school to 
earn a college degree, and so is likely possessed of a strong will and sense 
of personal accomplishment.  Her fear of loss of control over her life might 
trump any worries she has for her health – remember that she began to 
isolate herself more when she developed involuntary twitches from her 
medication.  An additional problem is that the client may project the stigma 
she feels as one diagnosed with mental illness onto her attorney.  As we 
have seen from our work in the criminal justice system, the client who has 
been told she is worthless for much of her life may have trouble believing 
that anyone competent would willingly take up her cause, and so may 
distrust the appointed attorney’s motives or abilities.  “It is almost a truism 
that a criminal defendant would rather have the most inept private counsel 
than the most skilled and capable public defender.”101 
V.  APPLICATION TO GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS 
A. Context 
Every state provides proceedings by which an adult may have her rights 
to act on her behalf partially or totally placed in the hands of another, who 
is charged with the responsibility to act as a guardian (or, in some states, 
conservator) of that person’s best interests. This deprivation of legal capacity 
to act and placement in the hands of another is “an extraordinary exercise 
of governmental authority,” and a “broad and very restrictive form of 
 
 100. Herr, supra note 32, at 639. 
 101. People v. Huffman, 139 Cal. Rptr. 264, 267 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
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substitute decision making . . . .”102  The need for a guardian does not grow 
out of a specific (or indeed any) diagnosis, but rather out of functional 
impairments which may be manifestations of an illness or condition at any 
given point in time.  Modern guardianship statutes recognize this and seek, 
at least in principle, to minimize the intrusion by “afford[ing] the person the 
greatest amount of independence and self-determination and participation 
in all the decisions affecting such person’s life.”103 
Accordingly, courts are directed to employ “the least restrictive form of 
intervention” possible,104 meaning only granting the guardian “those powers 
which are necessary to provide for that person’s personal needs and/or 
property management and which are consistent with affording that person 
the greatest amount of independence and self-determination in light of that 
person’s understanding and appreciation of the nature and consequences 
of his or her functional limitations.”105  Whether courts in fact do so, 
because of the structure of the guardianship statutes106 or out of an 
institutional tendency towards paternalism is another matter – as is whether 
this failure makes court practices subject to challenge under the ADA.107  
Finding the nexus between mental illness and lack of capacity can be tricky 
and also may be contextually and temporally bound. Having first found lack 
of capacity, many judges are reluctant to tie the hands of the guardian both 
out of a sense of paternalism and to avoid the need for further 
proceedings.108 
B. General Considerations 
The attorney representing someone who is the subject of a guardianship 
petition should employ the same least restrictive approach in her dealings 
with her client.  As the ABA has observed, “protective action should be 
 
 102. ROBERT D. FLEISCHNER, CTR. FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, GUARDIANSHIP, EXTRAORDINARY 
TREATMENT AND SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT 1 (2000). 
 103. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.01 (McKinney 2006).  See also, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE 
§ 1800 (West 2011) (expressing legislative intent, inter alia, to “increas[e] the conservatee’s 
functional abilities to whatever extent possible” and “allow the conservatee to remain as 
independent and in the least restrictive setting as possible”). 
 104. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.03(d). 
 105. Id. §§ 81.03(d), 81.02(a)(2).  See also, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1800. 
 106. The finding of incapacity acts as an “on/off” switch triggering the loss of certain 
rights.  Only after this finding does the court consider whether any restrictions should be 
placed on the guardianship.  This finding may act as an anchor and may prompt judges to be 
overrestrictive. 
 107. Salzman, supra note 2, at 173-82. 
 108. Henry A. Dlugacz, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment:  Some Thoughts on 
Promoting a Meaningful Dialogue Between Mental Health Advocates and Lawmakers, 53 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 79, 89 (2008-09). 
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exercised with caution in a limited manner consistent with the nature of the 
particular lawyer/client relationship and the client’s needs . . . .”109  This 
means that, in the particular context of guardianship proceedings, the 
attorney must be very cautious about taking any action that would reveal to 
the party petitioning for guardianship, the court, or anyone else not 
protected by attorney-client privilege the attorney’s concerns about client 
competence.  “Incapacity,” i.e., that “the person is unable to provide for 
personal needs and/or property management” and “cannot adequately 
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability” is 
the very thing that the petitioner is seeking to establish.  Effectively 
conceding the issue would result in serious long-term deprivations of client 
autonomy (i.e., by appointment of a guardian).110 
The guardianship attorney must take a nuanced view of how to promote 
self-determination.  One option would be to focus on the immediate result, 
and always advocate for the least intrusion on the client’s short-term 
autonomy.  However, where the client is not presently equipped to exercise 
her autonomy, this may be setting her up to fail.  The client may find herself 
the subject of a further petition, or may simply fail to provide for her own 
needs.  If Ms. X is left completely to her own devices, her physical and 
mental condition may deteriorate to the point of dangerouness  A short-term 
intervention (such as treatment, supported decision-making, or negotiating a 
resolution involving a guardian with power limited in scope, duration, or 
both) may promote her long-term autonomy by restoring her to competence 
or providing her with the resources she needs to move towards greater 
independence. 
Many questions are raised in such circumstances. Is it ethical to pursue 
such a course? How is the right to self-determination vindicated in the 
extreme case where the client may be responding to hallucinations?  Should 
Ms. X’s attorney vigorously contest the petition and oppose any involvement 
by her psychiatrist or brother, despite clear evidence that she suffers greatly 
in the absence of treatment and indications that her brother has her best 
interests at heart?  Is doing what the client wishes at that point promoting 
self-determination in the highest tradition of putting aside one’s 
preconceived notions, or does simply following the client’s direction in such 
circumstances make a farce of that ethical precept?  Is helping her avoid a 
guardianship in the moment the best way to promote self-determination 
when long-term functioning will decline without intervention, leading to 
more restrictive interventions such as involuntary civil commitment? 
 
 109. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
 110. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 2006). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] THE ETHICS OF REPRESENTING CLIENTS 357 
While states have developed different approaches, a goal of modern 
guardianship statutes is “preserving the autonomy of [alleged incapacitated 
persons] to the extent possible while providing necessary support for matters 
beyond the [incapacitated person’s] competency.”111  One specific 
manifestation of this least intrusive alternative approach is the imperative to 
consider the sufficiency of community resources which might obviate the 
need for a guardian.112  What is the lawyer’s duty to attempt to secure those 
resources – e.g., a case manager, housing, psychiatric treatment – which 
would make a guardian unneeded?  Is it permissible to breach 
confidentiality on the basis of client need without making a simultaneous 
effort to assist with procuring needed services?  To repeat, these questions 
can only be answered in the individual case, not in the abstract.  The next 
section proposes some concrete approaches to these dilemmas. 
C. Concrete Solutions 
1. Involvement of Family or Friends 
Clients with mental disabilities may rely to varying degrees on the 
assistance of family and friends in their everyday lives.  Consequently, the 
client may want or expect them to be involved in her legal representation, as 
well.  Friends and family can be valuable resources to the attorney, but can 
also present thorny ethical problems. 
Family and friend involvement can be beneficial for a number of 
reasons.  They are most likely to know the client’s premorbid desires and 
values.  The client may trust family and friends, and prefer their involvement.  
If the family and friends are trustworthy, this approach mimics the supported 
decision-making model (discussed below) that can encourage client 
participation and autonomy.113  Yet there are also risks to the duties of 
confidentiality and client loyalty.  “Even though a family may appear united 
when initially meeting with the attorney, the possibilities of conflicts are 
staggering.”114  Friends and family may have interests that diverge from the 
client’s in subtle ways; if the client is the individual who is the subject of the 
 
 111. See also MICHAEL L. PERLIN, PAMELA R. CHAMPINE, HENRY A. DLUGACZ & MARY CONNELL, 
COMPETENCE IN THE LAW:  FROM LEGAL THEORY TO CLINICAL APPLICATION 248 (2008), citing, 
e.g., N.Y. M.H.L., at § 81.01. 
 112. See, e.g., N.Y. M.H.L.§81.02 (“In deciding whether the appointment is necessary, the 
court shall consider the report of the court evaluator . . . and the sufficiency and reliability of 
available resources . . . to provide for personal needs or property management without the 
appointment of a guardian.”). 
 113. See infra Part D.1. 
 114. Barbara Carlin, Ethical Considerations and the Client with Diminished Capacity, 
TOOLE, CARLIN & POWERS, P.A., at 1, 6, http://www.elderlawinme.com/ethical.pdf (last visited 
June 10, 2011). 
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guardianship petition (as opposed to the family members, who might also 
seek representation in connection with the petition), it is critical to track 
where direction is coming from and ensure that the family is assisting the 
client in making decisions, not making decisions for her.  Even if both Ms. X 
and the attorney trust Ms. X’s brother, it is Ms. X who should be making 
decisions about the representation to the greatest extent possible.  This 
approach may also create privilege problems, especially if the family 
members’ or friends’ interests might later be found to diverge from that of 
the client.  Frequently, the very people who bring the petition for 
guardianship may be family or friends,115 or those who stand to benefit from 
distributions of estate or trust property if the person is judged to be in need 
of guardianship.116 
Monetary issues rear their head particularly in this context.  In one of the 
author’s (HD) experience, guardianship may be employed with the poor, 
because the alternatives that can prevent it – such as health care proxies, 
powers of attorney, living wills – require access to legal counseling or 
knowledge which may require the ability  to pay attorney’s fees.  Ms. X has 
never put in place any of these protective measures, and her dwindling 
resources may not be enough to cover the cost of them now.  At the same 
time, the wealthy may find themselves targets of a guardianship petition 
when a family member or friend seeks to use the process as a means to 
control the disposition of property prior to death and disposition by probate 
or to preserve future inheritance—which is Ms. X’s fear.117 
2. Appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem 
In the hopes of getting clear direction and reducing the complexity of 
the representation, the attorney confronted with a client with diminished 
competency may wish to have a guardian ad litem appointed to make 
decisions for the client.  The Model Rules permit this approach.118 
The fundamental benefit to this approach is that the attorney receives 
clear direction from a person appointed by a court to so act, eliminating 
questions about the attorney’s legal and ethical authority to carry out the 
directions he is given. In the case of a severely incapacitated client, or one 
who is extremely reliant on family members who may not have the client’s 
best interests at heart, a guardian ad litem may protect the client from 
advertent or inadvertent overreaching by family or friends, and can protect 
the attorney from similar accusations.  The cost to this approach is extremely 
 
 115. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.06 (McKinney 2006). 
 116. See, e.g., id. 
 117. Rein, supra note 2, at 243.  See also PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra 
note 111. 
 118. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14(b) (2010). 
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high, however.  It completely supplants client decision-making, and can be 
alienating and traumatizing for the client, who may not trust the guardian ad 
litem.119  Further, the attorney is not absolved of his responsibilities.  He 
cannot rely blindly on the guardian ad litem’s direction, but still must make 
“an independent determination of the client’s interests.”120  In the 
guardianship context, it is difficult to see how an attorney could carry out his 
duties to the client and seek appointment of a guardian ad litem.  If the 
client’s disability is slight or moderate, the other accommodations and 
support techniques discussed elsewhere here should suffice.  If the client’s 
disability is so severe as to make some form of guardianship a forgone 
conclusion, cooperative participation from those involved in the client’s life 
is probably the appropriate approach, and the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem would only seem to add an unnecessary, uninformed party to the 
mix. 
3. Following the Client’s Directions Literally 
One option available to the attorney who suspects the client may have 
diminished competency would be to follow the client’s directions literally and 
unquestioningly.  From one perspective, this seems to serve autonomy by 
eliminating the risk of the attorney overbearing the client’s will.  Indeed, 
some have contended that “[d]irect representation of the client’s expressed 
wishes is clearly the optimal approach from ethical and pragmatic 
perspectives.”121 
We would question that approach, even for fully competent clients, for 
reasons outlined in Section II above.  The attorney cannot know whether the 
client is making an informed decision until he has tested the client’s decision 
against her stated values and rationales.  The client is entitled to the benefit 
of the attorney’s opinion, and is not well served unless she receives it. 
In the guardianship context, this may manifest in the client who indicates 
she wishes to resist the petition.  Even though this direction may accord with 
the attorney’s own views – he may have difficulty imagining being under 
anyone’s guardianship, as well – he should engage in a firm and clear 
exploration of the client’s wishes.  The client may not understand the many 
nuanced outcomes that may be available to her, including a guardianship 
limited in scope or duration.  It is as disparaging of individual choice to 
assume that all clients wish to engage in adversarial proceedings as it is to 
assume that all clients with a mental disability lack decisional capacity.  It 
may be perfectly rational to be relieved at the prospect of having assistance 
 
 119. Rein, supra note 2, at 245. 
 120. Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients:  The Ethical Duty of Representation in 
Children’s Class Action Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1446 (1996). 
 121. Herr, supra note 32, at 641. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
360 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 4:331 
with the daily struggles of life.  Do not many of us want to give up this 
responsibility?  It is likewise perfectly human to deny, particularly to a 
stranger, that assistance is required.  Further, it can be tremendously 
stressful and destructive to litigate these proceedings, and a client who 
initially indicates her desire to resist the petition may not wish to pursue 
aggressive litigation once she understands what is involved.  It is 
paternalistic to attempt to force a person to pursue all of their “rights,” 
whether it is driven by cause-oriented lawyering or a failure to explore with 
the client her options and the basis for her stated preferences. 
In failing to explore all possibilities, including settlement of the 
proceeding with appointment of a guardian, the attorney would be acting as 
an advocate for the client’s presently stated interests – which benefits short-
term autonomy – but with possibly poor outcomes for the client in the long 
run. Some states endorse this “advocate” role explicitly by requiring 
attorneys to pursue a client’s opposition to the provision of mental health 
services whenever the client expresses opposition to them.122  These states 
do not appear to take into consideration the possibility that the client’s 
presently expressed desires may not reflect her considered opinion, and may 
undermine her long-term prospects of independence. Further, while we 
strongly support the overriding value of self-determination, there are real-life 
circumstances where blindly following the client’s wishes without critical 
exploration, or permitting the client to express herself in court on the record, 
can lead to almost farcical situations where the client becomes the subject 
of demeaning ridicule in a public forum.  Ms. X’s desire for independence 
and dignity may not be advanced by allowing her to testify at length about 
the people tapping her phone and the scheming of her brother and 
psychiatrist.  We offer no bright line rule for handling these situations but 
suggest that just as the lawyer’s proper role as advocate should be 
tempered by some humility and self-exploration, the right to self-
determination should not prevent the attorney from attempting to aid the 
client in preserving dignity.  In all instances, the client has the right to our 
clearly articulated opinion regarding the likelihood of success and the 
consequences of certain actions. 
 
 122. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.004 (Vernon 2009) (“[r]egardless 
of an attorney’s personal opinion, the attorney shall use all reasonable efforts within the 
bounds of law to advocate the proposed patient’s right to avoid court-ordered mental health 
services if the proposed patient expresses a desire to avoid the services”); In re Mental Health 
of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 500 (Mont. 2001) (“the proper role of the attorney is to ‘represent 
the perspective of the respondent and to serve as a vigorous advocate for the respondent’s 
wishes’”) (quoting NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR INVOLUNTARY CIVIL 
COMMITMENT, 10 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 410, 465 (1986)). 
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4. Accommodations in Court Proceedings 
Contested proceedings can be very stressful, because the client may 
already be uncomfortable in the foreign environment, and because the need 
to testify can be destructive to the client’s family and professional 
relationships.  Assuming the client is able to understand the risks involved, 
the attorney should not seek to avoid such proceedings if the client has 
given her informed consent.  Instead, when indicated, he may consider 
seeking accommodations within the proceeding.  Frequent breaks or 
transitional objects123 may help keep the client comfortable and engaged.  
Adjournments to seek support and treatment might obviate the need for 
guardianship, or at least improve the client’s ability to meaningfully 
participate in the proceeding.  However, in the guardianship context, 
seeking these accommodations tacitly concedes that the person may not be 
competent.  This area is fraught with complexities and no categorical 
solution applies.  In practical terms, however, an attorney can work on these 
issues with the client – to identify what accommodations may be needed, or 
find some way to provide them sub rosa – before bringing them to the 
attention of the court. 
5. Withdrawal 
A final option is for the attorney to withdraw from the representation.  
Given the difficulty of navigating the demands of autonomy for a client with 
diminished competency, withdrawal may be appealing to some.  (One 
hopes that the attorney who agrees to represent the subject of a 
guardianship petition is already prepared for these sorts of dilemmas, 
however.)  The benefit to withdrawing is that it eliminates the dilemma for 
the attorney.  It is certain that he will not supplant the client’s decision-
making authority.124  That is the only benefit.  Withdrawal does not solve the 
underlying dilemma for the next attorney, and can be extremely prejudicial 
for the client.  It “only solves the lawyer’s problem and may belittle the 
client’s interest.”125  It often signals to the court and opposition that 
something is wrong. The ABA discourages withdrawal,126 noting that it may 
be impossible to withdraw without prejudicing the client’s interests, 
particularly where the client’s disability has worsened over the course of the 
representation, making it more difficult for any new counsel to serve the 
 
 123. A transitional object is a possession that carries special meaning for the individual, 
and can provide a source of comfort in unfamiliar surroundings. 
 124. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
 125. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (quoting 
CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 162 (1986)). 
 126. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
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client effectively.127  We do not regard withdrawal as a genuine option in the 
guardianship context, except in the most extreme circumstances, but include 
it for the sake of discussion. 
D. Possible Alternatives to Guardianship 
There are a number of alternatives to guardianship of which an attorney 
practicing in this context should be aware.  Some require advance planning, 
while others can be brought into play after a guardianship petition has been 
filed as a means to effectuate legislative intent to employ the least restrictive 
means possible in ensuring that the basic needs of individuals with mental 
disability are met. 
1. Supported Decision-making 
Supported decision-making occurs when an individual “receives support 
from a trusted individual, network of individuals, or entity to make personal, 
financial, and legal decisions that must be followed by third parties . . . .”128  
It differs from substituted decision-making (such as occurs in guardianship 
or when an attorney acts contrary to her client’s stated preferences) in that 
the person receives help in understanding her choices and articulating them, 
but final authority over the decisions rests with her.  This can ameliorate the 
downward spiral in functioning which can flow from a determination of 
incapacity – once you are thought of as incapacitated, your opinion is not 
sought, you lose the decision-making skills you have, and you become 
dependent on others.  “[P]erceived loss of control causes people to suffer 
mental and physical decline.”129  Access to supported decision-making is 
now the preferred norm by international treaty.  The Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), to which the United States is a 
signatory but which it has yet to ratify, requires states to “take appropriate 
measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they 
may require in exercising their legal capacity.”130  Other nations have begun 
to provide for supported decision-making by statute or practice.131  In the 
guardianship context, it is worth noting the point made by Surrogate Booth 
in a New York guardianship matter: Although the United States has not 
ratified the CRPD, “a state’s obligations under it are controlled by the 
 
 127. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
 128. Salzman, supra note 2, at 180. 
 129. Rein, supra note 2, at 243. 
 130. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature Mar. 30, 
2007, G.A. Res. 61/106, art.12(3), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106, (Dec. 6, 2006).  See also 
Salzman, supra note 2, at 231-32. 
 131. Doug Surtees, The Evolution of Co-Decision-Making in Saskatchewan, 73 SASK. L. 
REV. 75, 83-84 (2010). 
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Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties[,] which requires signatories ‘to 
refrain from acts which would defeat  [the Disability Convention’s] object 
and purpose.’”132 
2. Enhanced Community Services That Could Obviate the Need for 
Guardianship 
While the manifestations of a mental disability may wax and wane,133 
leading to the oft-described “lucid intervals,”134 a growing body of literature 
describes evidence-based practices which can lead to recovery from, or 
prolonged periods of remission from, serious mental illnesses.135 As noted, 
the modern trend in guardianship law is towards a functional approach that 
examines the alleged incapacitated person’s ability to handle the activities of 
daily living without any diagnostic predicate.136 In contrast, earlier statutes 
required a certain “status” such as diagnosis of dementia or mental illness 
as a predicate for guardianship.137  Some statutes combine elements of both 
 
 132. In re SCPA Article 17-A Guardianship Proceeding for Mark C.H., Ward, 906 
N.Y.S.2d 419, 433 (Sur. 2010) (citing Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 18, 
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331). 
 133. Another issue to consider is the extent to which symptoms and their attendant 
reductions in social functioning are iatrogenic – that is, caused by medications or 
combinations of medications – and thus subject to reversal.  See EDMUND H. DUTHIE, JR. & 
PAUL R. KATZ, PRACTICE OF GERIATRICS 65-6 (3rd ed. 1998) (1986) (defining iatrogenic illness 
as “any illness that results from a diagnostic procedure or therapeutic intervention or any 
harmful occurrence that is not a natural consequence of the patient’s underlying illness”).  The 
same is true of disturbances in mental status caused by treatable medical conditions.  While it 
may seem obvious, it bears emphasis that mental illness is not protective of medical illness; 
quite the contrary, people with severe mental illnesses have elevated rates of many major 
medical conditions.  See generally Marc De Hert et al., Physical Illness in Patients with Severe 
Mental Disorders. I. Prevalence, Impact of Medications and Disparities in Health Care, 
10 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 52, 52-53 (2011).  That is to say, these areas of inquiry are not 
categorical, but rather form the component parts of a full bio-psycho-social-legal assessment 
of the situation. 
 134. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1033 (9th ed. 2009). 
 135. See, e.g., EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE (Robert E. Drake & 
Howard H. Goldman eds., 2003) (noting the collection of articles on evidence-based research 
within this book). 
 136. PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 249-50.  See, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. § 744.102(12) (2010). 
 137. PERLIN , CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 249-50.  See, e.g., 
UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 1-201(7) (1982, amended 1997), 8A 
U.L.A. 429 (2003). 
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approaches,138 both of which have been criticized as having arbitrary 
elements.139 
To the extent a jurisdiction errs toward a functional threshold, supports 
and treatment for people with severe mental illnesses may avoid or limit the 
unwanted intrusion on their autonomy that guardianship signifies.  Each 
situation and individual are different, but, aside from the efficacy of properly 
prescribed and monitored medications, there are five widely accepted 
evidence-based practices that have been found effective in the treatment of 
severe mental illness.140  First, assertive community treatment provides a 
multi-disciplinary approach to care, where teams with very low caseloads 
(10:1 ratio) provide 24-hour-a-day access to crises care and other forms of 
treatment.141  Services are provided in vivo, or where the person resides, 
rather than requiring the person to attend appointments in a clinic or 
hospital.142 Second, family psychoeducation provides education for family 
members and others providing support for consumers of mental health 
services.143 It encourages collaboration between family, the person with a 
mental disability, and clinicians to improve outcomes and has been shown 
to enhance the quality of life for participants.144  Third, illness management 
and recovery centers on the person with a mental disability taking 
responsibility for her own life and fosters collaboration between caregiver 
and participants.145 Fourth, where applicable, integrated dual diagnosis 
treatment for those with substance abuse difficulties as well as mental illness 
emphasizes motivational interventions and cognitive-behavioral treatments, 
provided in an integrated manner rather than treating the two issues 
separately.146 Finally, supported employment, where vocational services are 
 
 138. PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 251. 
 139. Id. at 250.  The status approach relies heavily on the vagaries of psychiatric 
diagnosis, while the functional approach does not distinguish between illness and eccentricity.  
Id. at 249-50. 
 140. Robert E. Drake et al., Implementing Evidence-Based Practices in Routine Mental 
Health Service Settings, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 136, 
at 1. 
 141. Susan D. Phillips et al., Moving Assertive Community Treatment into Standard 
Practice, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 47, 48. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Lisa Dixon et al., Evidence-Based Practices for Services to Families of People With 
Psychiatric Disabilities, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, 
at 57, 58. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Frederick J. Frese III et al., Integrating Evidence-Based Practices and the Recovery 
Model, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 21, 22. 
 146. Robert E. Drake et al., Implementing Dual Diagnosis Services for Clients With Severe 
Mental Illness, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 39, 
39-41. 
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integrated with mental health treatment, has been found to be successful in 
leading to competitive employment.147 
3. Legal Planning That Can Obviate the Need for Guardianship 
Anyone with sufficient foresight, means, and mental capacity can greatly 
reduce the likelihood that she will require a guardian.148  The execution of a 
durable power of attorney or irrevocable trust while the person is competent 
are two ways people with access to legal advice make prior arrangements 
so that they (or a proxy of their choosing) can continue to enter into 
financial arrangements before they become incompetent.149  Likewise, 
execution of a health care proxy or living will (in jurisdictions where they are 
given force of law) may permit a person to avoid the expense and 
humiliation of a guardianship proceeding with respect to personal decision-
making.150  Had Ms. X established any of these protections when she was 
first injured, she could have set boundaries on the type of assistance she 
wanted from others, avoided invasive questioning from APS and the court 
about her mental state, and ensured that her financial resources were 
managed by someone trustworthy.  There is an emphasis on the need for 
advance planning, which in part is reliant on access to legal advice. 
VI.  ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A. Attorney Competence 
Representation of persons with mental disabilities is routinely not of the 
highest caliber.151  Attorneys may lack the expertise necessary to 
competently handle the delicate issues raised by mental disabilities.152  The 
limitations of time and expense imposed on appointed attorneys may be 
crippling.153  Whether owing to personal discomfort, ingrained prejudices, 
or a lack of expertise, judges sometimes fail to hold counsel to the highest 
standards of the profession in proceedings involving mental disability 
 
 147. Gary R. Bond et al., Implementing Supported Employment as an Evidence-Based 
Practice, in EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH CARE, supra note 135, at 29, 29. 
 148. PERLIN, CHAMPINE, DLUGACZ & CONNELL, supra note 111, at 245. 
 149. Id. at 245-46. 
 150. Id. at 245. 
 151. Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Assumption:  A Critical Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in 
Mental Disability Cases, 16 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 39, 43-45 (1992). 
 152. See, e.g., In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 492 (Mont. 2001) 
(“‘[R]easonable professional assistance’ cannot be presumed in a proceeding that routinely 
accepts – and even requires – an unreasonably low standard of legal assistance and generally 
disdains zealous, adversarial confrontation.”). 
 153. Id. (noting that in “an involuntary commitment proceeding . . . counsel typically has 
less than 24 hours to prepare for a hearing on a State petition . . . .”). 
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issues.154  Because one plays to the level of one’s competition, this may 
result in sloppy lawyering, with insufficient attention to the applicable legal 
standards or the client’s goals. 
An attorney has an obligation to provide competent representation to 
her client.155  Since most attorneys do not have experience dealing with 
clients with mental disabilities and are not trained as mental health 
professionals, they are often ill-equipped to accurately identify or develop 
responses to a client’s disability.  Reading a few articles on mental disability 
and ethics will not prepare the attorney to deal with the complexities of a 
client manifesting symptoms of a disability.  Yet such judgments are 
unavoidable.  An attorney confronted with a client of questionable capacity 
is already making a determination of that client’s capacity, even if only 
preliminarily and for the purpose of determining whether intervention or 
additional guidance from others is warranted.156  To comply with his ethical 
obligations, an attorney who is likely to come into contact with clients with 
limited competency must make efforts to educate himself about the 
symptoms of mental disability and illness so that he can recognize them.157  
In the event of a client showing significant symptoms, he should either seek 
guidance from an attorney experienced with such clients, or support from a 
medical professional, support network, or similar organization with the 
appropriate background. 
Beyond the question of assessment, the attorney must also ensure that 
he is equipped to understand the substantive mental health issues at play.  
He must be able to analyze medical records and effectively interview and 
question physicians and mental health professionals.158  He must also 
understand the “range of alternative, less-restrictive treatment and care 
options available . . . .” in the client’s community.159 
Specialized interview skills may also be required.160  People with mental 
disabilities may have difficulty presenting material in a linear fashion.  It is 
important to use the right mixture of open-ended questions to allow the 
person time to tell her story (narrative truth) in her own way, but move to 
closed-ended (yes or no) questions when preparing for trial or to get very 
 
 154. Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2, at 669-71. 
 155. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (1980). 
 156. A.B.A. COMM’N ON L. & AGING & AMER. PSYCH. ASS’N, ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS 
WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY:  A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS 1 (2005) [hereinafter DIMINISHED 
CAPACITY HANDBOOK]. 
 157. Id. at 8.  Such clients are likely to be encountered in criminal defense, poverty law, 
probate, and, of course, guardianship practices. 
 158. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 65, at 702-03. 
 159. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 498 (Mont. 2001). 
 160. Perlin, Sanism, supra note 65, at 703. 
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specific required information. Though it may be particularly tempting (and 
sometimes necessary)161 to try to correct factual misunderstandings, this may 
result in the attorney arguing with the client – which is disruptive to the 
relationship.  It may be impossible to convince Ms. X that her phone was 
never tapped and that her psychiatrist and brother are not conspiring 
against her, and efforts to convince her otherwise may lead her to a rupture 
in the attorney-client relationship.  It is important to recall that much of what 
we think of as objective truth is really subjective.  For example, the 
temperature in a room may be viewed as an empirical inquiry, but whether it 
feels hot or cold is not.  Whether Ms. X’s apartment has stacks of 
newspapers in it is empirical, but whether these stacks suggest mental illness 
or just an individual taste is not.  Recalling this simple example can help the 
attorney avoid getting involved in counter-productive arguments with the 
client.  Looking for themes in the client’s communications and listening to 
her sufficiently to understand the nuances of what she wants with regard to 
the proceeding can be a sophisticated undertaking, but both good 
lawyering and truly ethical practice may require just such an endeavor.  The 
Honorable Jack B. Weinstein once said, “We are responsible not only for 
the rule of law.  We are also accountable for the principle of empathy and 
humanity.”162  In describing the fundamental difference between the 
approach employed by social workers and that of the legal profession, 
Judge Weinstein went on to say: “As I sometimes tell my law clerks, ‘As 
judges, we must learn to be superficial.’  This fundamental difference 
between the two professions may be summed up as ‘tell me more’ versus 
‘get to the point.’”163 
B. Use of Experts 
Experts may serve distinct purposes at different stages.  An attorney 
whose client seeks to avoid future challenges to advance directives and 
financial planning methods, which may obviate the need for guardianship 
later in life, may have a neutral expert evaluate and document the client’s 
capacity at the time that the instruments are executed.  At other times, an 
expert may be employed following the filing of petition. 
The attorney must be careful not to place complete reliance on a mental 
health expert for several reasons.  The attorney is ethically required to 
 
 161. An attorney should accept the client’s view to the extent possible.  But, from time to 
time, the attorney may be required to confront factual issues that may be bound up with poor 
reality testing. 
 162. Jack B. Weinstein, When is a Social Worker as Well as a Lawyer Needed?, 2 J. INST. 
STUD. LEG. ETH. 391, 391 (1999). 
 163. Id. 
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exercise his own professional judgment.164 The legal standards for capacity 
are not identical with those of the mental health professions,165 though they 
are intertwined.  Finally, mental health professions may have a bias towards 
intervention and treatment – expertise seeks its own use.166 
C. Danger of Outcome-Oriented Assessments 
Implicit in our discussion of the need for self-evaluation, but still meriting 
separate mention, is that the attorney must be careful not to make 
judgments about whether the client is demonstrating competence based 
primarily on whether the client’s decisions accord with his own.  “[A] client’s 
decision that accords with the professional’s judgment may be seen as a 
well-considered decision.”167  As the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers has observed in the context of criminal defense, the 
“ambiguous ethical norm related to an attorney’s obligation to facilitate 
client participation and an attorney’s paternalistic attitude relevant to 
decision making in cases involving defendants with mental health histories” 
makes it “tempting for a defense lawyer to usurp a client’s authority, 
especially if the client is difficult to work with, mentally ill, or lacks insight 
into his mental illness.”168  The ABA made a similar observation in its formal 
opinion on clients with disabilities.  “A client who is making decisions that 
the lawyer considers to be ill-considered is not necessarily unable to act in 
his own interest, and the lawyer should not seek protective action merely to 
protect the client from what the lawyer believes are errors in judgment.”169  
The attorney must be certain, when evaluating his client’s competence, that 
he is asking not whether the client is acting in a way that makes sense to the 
attorney, but whether she is acting in a way that accords with her own 
demonstrated premorbid preferences.  The question must remain the same 
even where the client’s decision accords with the attorney’s.  For example, 
the attorney who favors aggressive litigation may believe his client is acting 
competently when she chooses a similar tack, even though she is, in fact, 
simply relying on the attorney, or operating under a misconception about 
what the consequences will be for her everyday life.  “In other words, the 
client’s capacity must be judged against the standard set by that person’s 
own habitual or considered standards of behavior and values, rather than 
 
 164. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-2 (1980). 
 165. See DIMINISHED CAPACITY HANDBOOK, supra note 156, at 5-12 (2005). 
 166. See Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 2, at 641-59. 
 167. Herr, supra note 32, at 621. 
 168. John M. Fabian, How to Deal With Difficult Clients from a Mental Health Perspective, 
THE CHAMPION, June 2007, at 25, 27. 
 169. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996). 
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against conventional standards held by others.”170  Ms. X may have made 
an unusual set of choices about how to live her life, and those choices may 
weigh on Ms. X’s physical health and finances, but the attorney cannot 
assume that they are the product of mental illness simply because they 
deviate widely from his own choices. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The root principle is hard to take issue with: Humans are entitled to 
autonomy, and those who have mental disabilities and need attorneys are 
entitled to no less presumption of autonomy than anyone else.  As we hope 
this article has shown, however, putting this principle into practice in the 
representation of a person who is the subject of a guardianship petition 
forces the attorney to make difficult decisions that often compromise one or 
another aspect of the client’s autonomy based on limited knowledge and 
expertise.  There is no avoiding these dilemmas, at least not as a society.  
Whether any individual attorney chooses to participate or not, the 
guardianship system will continue to process petitions, and individuals will 
have significant decisions made about their capacity to act on their own 
behalves.  There are also no categorical solutions.  The attorney who fights 
a petition too ferociously may do as much harm as the attorney who raises 
little defense at all.  Each case demands that the attorney employ his skills to 
communicate effectively, listen carefully, evaluate the client’s competency 
based on his own experience and the resources available to him, and work 
with the client to protect her long-term autonomy at minimal cost to her 
short-term autonomy.  We are hopeful that this article has provided some 
context on these issues, some practical suggestions, and a framework for 
debate in a frequently ignored area. 
  
 
 170. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (quoting 
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